Abstract-In this paper, the problem of intrusion detection using pyroelectric infrared (PIR) sensors is investigated. We study the output PIR signal in the light of the intruder's trajectory and the geometry of the sensor's field of view (FOV) and propose an inverse-square law that describes the relation of incident heat flux to the distance. The signal is modeled by a sum of exponentially modulated sinusoids. Consequently, the intrusion detection is formulated as a hypothesis testing problem and we propose an exponentially windowed periodogram (EWP) detector, which is also able to detect the direction of movement. The simulation results shows the superior performance of the EWP detector when compared to conventional detectors such as the traditional periodogram detector and the energy detector over large distances. Furthermore, results show nearly 100% correct detection of the direction of movement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion detection is a vital field of research with significant practical impact. Several sensor modalities are used for intrusion detection, some of which are magnetic, acoustic, seismic, and thermal sensors [1] . However, pyroelectric infrared (PIR) sensors present themselves as an attractive option due to their low power requirement, low cost, and small form factor. PIR sensors are made from pyroelectric crystals that are intrinsically polarized [2] . When exposed to temperature change, the polarization is temporally disturbed producing a current proportional to the heat gradient. Thus, PIR sensors measure the change in temperature making them suitable for motion detection. Usually, two sensor elements are connected serially in reverse polarity, thus producing a positive voltage when motion occurs in the positive element field of view (FOV) and a negative voltage when motion occurs in the negative element's FOV. Hence, PIR sensors can be found in many indoor applications, such as [3] . Recently, PIR sensors were also used with wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in outdoor applications [4] , due to the previously stated features. However, due to limited detection range the outdoor applications are limited. Therefore, advanced processing techniques are needed in order to increase the detection range of the PIR sensors Several processing methods have been suggested in the literature. In [5] , energy detection with adaptive noise threshold was proposed. Simple high-pass filtering was also used to improve the SNR. A combination of the Haar transform and support-vector-machine was used in [6] to detect intrusion in the presence of clutter. In [7] , the authors proposed using a linear regression model in conjunction with hidden Markov models to detect and classify human walking movement. PIR sensors were used for tracking of direction and distance of motion in [8] via feature extraction methods. A set of two orthogonal PIR sensor pairs were used in [9] to detect the direction of movement.
In this paper we investigate increasing the detection range of PIR in outdoor environments using the statistical hypothesis testing framework leading to advanced signal processing methods, in contrast to the simplified processing adopted in [6] . Firstly, we show that the incident heat flux at the sensor obeys the inverse square law for an arbitrary source shape. Secondly, we model the incident heat flux time varying signal as a function of the intruders' trajectory parameters. Finally, we formulate the detection problem as multiple hypothesis testing.
This paper is organized as the following. Section II presents the system model. In Section III, the detection problem is formulated and the corresponding detection algorithms are proposed. Simulation results are provided in IV. Finally, the conclusions and future work are given in Section V.
II. MODELING OF INTRUDER'S SIGNATURE
In this section the time-varying heat flux signature generated by the intruder and the PIR sensor are formulated.
A. Intruder Heat Flux
We are interested in measuring the heat flux generated by a mobile intruder moving with constant speed and direction. The intruder is assumed to be in thermal equilibrium with its environment. The measured flux at the sensor mainly depends on the temperature, source geometry, and the spatial orientation of the intruder and the sensor with respect to (wrt) each other. Assuming a Lambertian grey body emitting uniformly in space, the heat flux at the sensor is [2] 
where 0 < ε < 1 is the intruder's emissivity, k B ≈ 1.381 × 10 −23 kg.m 2 /s 2 K is the Steveman-Boltzmann constant, T i is the intruder's absolute temperature, T e is the environment's temperature, A i is the intruder's surface area, and ω i,s is the projected solid angle of the intruder onto the sensor. So the geometry of the source w.r.t. the sensor is given by ωi,s = 1
where A s is the sensor's area, β i and β s are the angles of dA i and dA s wrt to the axis connecting them, and R i,s is the distance separating the infinitesimal elements dA i and dA s . Consequently, the total heat flux is found by solving the double integration in (1) and substituting in (1) .
For an arbitrary geometry, the incident heat flux is usually found by the finite element method (FEM), which is known to be cumbersome. Instead, we propose the following closedform approximation
which is simply an inverse square law relationship. The above approximation is compared with the FEM results in (1) for a human source at different distances. The results show excellent matching with our approximation for distances greater than 5 meters.
As the intruder passes in front of the PIR sensor, a Fresnel lens modulates the incident heat flux by partitioning the FOV into multiple segments 1 as shown in Fig. 2 (a), where each segment concentrates the flux onto the PIR sensor. Consequently, the PIR sensor's signal depends on the intruder's trajectory through the FOVs. Take for example an intruder crossing the central FOV segment with constant speed v making an angle ψ 0 with the main sensor axis at distance R 0 as shown in Fig.  2 (b). The squared distance between the intruder and the sensor is given by the cosine rule [6] as
Therefore, the incident heat flux has the form
e A i A s /4, t 0 is the entry time, and Π(t) is the unit rectangular function in the time interval 1 In the context of intrusion detection, such an arrangement increases the probability of detection. [0, 1]. In general, For (2F + 1) FOV segments indexed by j = −F, · · · , F , we have ψ j = ψ 0 − jϕ for j = 0. Thus, the heat flux signature has the form
where t j is the jth segment entry time.
Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) show the heat flux signal for an intruder moving toward and away from the sensor.
B. PIR Signal
The PIR sensor converts the impinging heat flux into an electrical voltage. The responsivity, which is the ratio of the output voltage to the input heat flux, completely characterizes the sensor. The responsivity is actually a bandpass system [10] given by
where K is the sensor's gain, τ t is the thermal time constant of the sensor, and τ e is the electrical time constant. Therefore, the output voltage signal is a filtered version of the heat flux in (6), i.e.,
where h(t) is the sensor's time-domain responsivity and * is the convolution operator. An example is given in Figs. 3(c) and 3(d). The PIR sensor elements are usually followed by a JFET voltage buffer, which superimposes the sensor signal on a dc bias of the transistor. Also, the signal is corrupted by noise, which is dependent on the sensor and the environment background heat radiation. However, we assume that the voltage signal at the input of the analog to digital converter, x(t), is appropriately conditioned to remove the dc bias and reduce the noise before being sampled at a sampling frequency of F s . Hence, the raw available sensor is
for 0 ≤ n ≤ N −1 where w[n] is assumed to be additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean and known variance, σ 2 .
III. INTRUSION DETECTION
For a given intruder's class (e.g. humans) the signal's energy is dependent on the separation distance, since the intruder's energy and the sensor's noise energy are fixed. Hence, we resort to statistical hypothesis testing methods to provide acceptable performance.The intrusion detection problem is formulated as the following hypothesis testing problem, i.e.,
One way to tackle this problem is to assume that s[n] is completely unknown, and so the optimal detector in this case would be the energy detector (ED), with the following test statistics
Unfortunately, the energy detector has the worse performance among all detectors, since no prior information is used.
Interestingly, we can infer some valuable information from the shape of the PIR signal. Indeed, s(t) in Fig 3(c) has a striking resemblance to an exponentially decaying sinusoid and to an exponentially increasing sinusoid in Fig. 3(d) . This observation is also consolidated by (8) . Furthermore, Figs 3(e) and 3(f) suggest having several dominant sinusoidal components. Hence, we propose the following approximation
where A i , f i , φ i are the ith amplitude, frequency, and phase of the ith component respectively. Whereas α ≥ 0 is the exponential factor and the parameter vector, a i = A i cos(φ i ) and b i = A i sin(φ i ). The above can be compactly represented in vector format as
where
T , and the columns of the matrix G(θ) are
Consequently, the detection problem can be formulated as
T . The above is a composite hypothesis testing, since θ needs to be estimated. An asymptotically optimal detector is the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) [11] . It can be shown that the GLRT reduces to finding the best projection of x onto the space spanned by the columns of G(θ), i.e.,
T is the projection matrix on the space spanned by the columns of G(θ).
Apparently, the GLRT is computationally demanding mainly due to the non-zero correlation between the columns of G(θ). Consequently, we propose a sub-optimal detector in which we assume orthogonal columns in G(θ). In other words,
for all α and f i 's. Hence, the resulting detector in this case has the form
(20) which for a given α is a separable maximization problem, i.e., it has L peaks at the optimal frequencies ( f i ) values.
The detector in (20) can be further simplified by noting that the correlations x T g c (α, f i ) and x T g s (α, f i ) can be decomposed into two steps. First, multiply the data samples, x[n], by the window function α n for a given α and 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. Defined the windowed data x α [n] and then the detector in (20) becomes
which we will call the exponentially windowed periodogram (EWP) detector. X α (f i ) in (21) is the widowed periodogram defined as
Thus, the EWP detector chooses the window that gives the greatest L spectral peaks. It follows that the periodogram detector (PD) is a special case of the EWP detector when α is fixed at unity, giving
Interestingly, the optimal window, α, found earlier gives an indication about the movement direction. If α < 1 then the signal is decreasing with time implying that the intruder is moving away from the sensor. Oppositely, if α > 1 the intruder is moving toward the sensor. Thus, Decide intruder is moving away from sensor, α > 1;
Decide intruder is moving toward from sensor, α < 1.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we have simulated a human intruder passing through the FOV of a PIR having F = 4 segments and γ = 7.5
o . The intruder moves with a constant speed of v = 5 kmph in a straight line making angle with the main PIR sensor axis of ψ = 50 0 away from the sensor. The intruder's temperature is T i = 37
o with emissivity ε = 1, environment temperature
o , sensor area A s = 20µm 2 and intruder area A i = 0.7m
2 . The PIR sensor has K = 6. × 10 3 , τ t = 4.2 sec, and τ e = 1 sec. The noise in the system is zero-mean AWGN with standard deviation of 50 µV.
We compare the detection performance via ROC graphs showing the probability of detection (P D ) against the probability of false alarm (P F A ) of the ED in (10), the EWD in (21), and the PD in (23) (both use L = 3 sinusoidal components) in a Monte Carlo simulation with 10 5 iterations. Two sets of simulations are run, one with the intruder moving away from the sensor and the second when the intruder is moving toward the sensor. Figs. 4-8 depict the ROC for different R 0 values when the intruder is moving away from the sensor, whereas Figs. 9-13 show the ROC when the intruder is moving toward the sensor. In general, for a relatively small distance, both the EWP and the PD achieve a similar performance as shown in Figs. 4,5,9, and 10, while still performing better than the ED. On the other hand, the rest of the figures show the superior performance of the EWD over large distances. Finally, the direction of movement is estimated by the EWD algorithm, by testing the α as mentioned before. The EWD achieves almost 100% correct direction estimation for all different distances as shown in Table I . We have investigated the problem of long range intrusion detection using PIR sensors. An inverse square-law relation is established for the incident heat flux and the separation distance. Then, the PIR sensor output signal is modeled by the sum of exponentially modulated sinusoids. Accordingly, an exponentially windowed periodogram detector is proposed showing very good detection performance for long distance cases when compared to both the conventional periodogram detector and the energy detector. In future work, we intend to investigate the use of sensor arrays for intrusion detection. 
